Climbing Up to Glory Read online

  Despite the numerous assurances uttered by Lincoln and other Republicans that slavery would be safe with their party in office, throughout the campaign, Democrats linked them to the cause of antislavery. They also argued that the Republican Party promoted racial equality for blacks, which was a subtle way of saying that they supported black men having access to white women—a position meant to inflame racial hatred, as it was certain to work on the psyche of white men. Others maintained that a Lincoln victory would serve as a catalyst for slaves to escape to the North and compete with whites for jobs. However, in response, the Republicans proudly proclaimed themselves to be the “White Man’s Party.”2 This proclamation was one that most Southern whites did not buy, and Lincoln’s election represented their darkest nightmare. Their whole world was now turned upside down. Indeed, it was imperative that the Southern states devise strategies to deal with this new state of affairs.

  Although most free blacks who could vote in 1860 supported Lincoln’s candidacy, outspoken abolitionist, writer, and orator Frederick Douglass and others did not. Their rationale for not backing him, however, was interesting. Whereas most Southern whites regarded Lincoln as a friend of blacks, some free blacks, Douglass among them, did not trust Lincoln and the Republican Party and looked upon him as being against the abolition of slavery. The party of the 1850s was haunted by the question of how to attract a large number of conservative whites while still projecting a humanitarian image of concern for the downtrodden by occasionally addressing their needs. This was a tough tightrope to walk, and Douglass and a few of his cohorts exposed its tenuous nature. They believed that in the election of 1860 the Republican Party would be no better than either wing of the Democratic Party in respect to working toward the abolition of slavery. As a consequence, although they realized that Gerrit Smith, the Radical Abolitionist Party nominee, stood no realistic chance of winning the presidency, they voted for him nonetheless. They were attracted to his candidacy because the party he represented supported the emancipation of all slaves. Douglass spoke passionately in defense of his vote and those of others for Smith, when he wrote, “Ten thousand votes for Gerrit Smith at this juncture would do more, in our judgment for the ultimate abolition of slavery in this country, than two million for Abraham Lincoln, or any other man who stands pledged before the world against all interference with slavery in the slave states, who is not pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or anywhere else the system exists, and who is not opposed to making the free states a hunting ground for men under the Fugitive Slave Law.”3 Thus, while the election of Lincoln was hailed by most blacks, some prominent African-Americans looked upon it with suspicion and apprehension. Regardless of how they personally felt, however, most blacks took a wait-and-see attitude toward Lincoln. Southern whites, however, could only envision a dark and gloomy existence under Lincoln and the Republicans.

  A little more than a month after the Republican victory, the South Carolina legislature ordered an election of delegates to a convention to decide the state’s future course. The convention voted unanimously to secede from the Union on December 20. Six other states of the lower South had followed suit by February 1, 1861. A provisional government of the Confederate States of America was established one week later at Montgomery, Alabama. Although Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas chose not to leave the Union at this time, they announced that they too would secede if the federal government attempted to use force against the new Confederacy. Thus, by the time of Lincoln’s inauguration in March 1861, the nation was rapidly falling apart. Most U.S. property in the Deep South had been seized by the Confederacy. The new president announced that he had no intention of forcibly reclaiming federal property, but he vowed to keep Fort Sumter, in the harbor at Charleston, South Carolina, and Fort Pickens, in Florida, under Union control and ordered them to be resupplied with arms and munitions. In response, the Confederates attacked Fort Sumter on April 14 and forced its commander to surrender. Lincoln regarded this action as a blatant disregard of federal authority. The Confederacy’s aggression had to be restrained. Northern whites responded enthusiastically to Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers, enlisting in such large numbers that many men had to be turned away. At this point, Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee seceded from the Union. The Civil War, which would last for four long, extremely bloody years had begun. Lincoln made it clear that his primary objective in the war would be to preserve the Union, not to abolish slavery.

  This objective would consistently guide many of the policies that Lincoln would endorse throughout the war. In fact, as late as mid-1862, in a letter written to Horace Greeley, the New York newspaper editor, Lincoln reiterated his position. As he passionately explained,

  My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help save the Union—I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.4

  Lincoln might have regarded the Civil War as a struggle to preserve the Union, but from its beginning some blacks, Frederick Douglass among them, were confident that the emancipation of the slaves must be a prerequisite for preservation. In fact, Douglass was certain that “any attempt now to separate the freedom of the slave from the victory of the government,—any attempt to secure peace to the whites while leaving the blacks in chains—will be labor lost. The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time; but the ‘inexorable logic of events’ will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery; and that it can never be effectually put down till one or the other of these vital forces is completely destroyed.” 5 As a result of this belief, Douglass wholeheartedly threw himself into the recruitment of blacks into the Union armed forces. Indeed, it was of paramount importance that blacks militarily contribute to a war that could ultimately lead to the emancipation of all slaves. Douglass’s belief proved to be prophetic. In addition, some blacks thought that if Lincoln were elected they would be freed even without a war. For example, Allen Williams remembered that “when Abe Lincoln was running for President, they said, if ‘Lincoln is elected the Niggers will be freed.’ ”6 Again, this proved to be prophetic.

  FREE BLACKS OFFER THEIR SERVICES TO THE UNION

  Believing that the Civil War was being fought over the issue of slavery, Northern free blacks were confident that a Union victory would lead to the emancipation of slaves. And any improvement in the status of the enslaved was certain to benefit all blacks. Free blacks hoped by fighting on the Union side to demonstrate that they were loyal and patriotic, deserving of acceptance into American society on equal terms with whites. But laws and the resistance and prejudice of whites kept them from taking up arms. Nevertheless, in city after city free blacks offered their services. They formed a military club in New York and drilled regularly until the police stopped them. Other blacks in the city tried to persuade the state governor to organize three regiments by promising him that blacks in the state would pay all of their own expenses for arms and equipment and even their salaries.7 Two regiments were formed in Philadelphia and drilled at Masonic Hall. Several Philadelphia blacks even proposed to go South and organize slave revolts, which they hoped would disrupt the Southern economy and wreak havoc. In Pittsburgh the all-black Hannibal Guards offered their services, pointing out that as American citizens they were anxious “to assist in any honorable way or manner to sustain the present situation.”8

  A group of Boston blacks met at the Twelfth Baptist Church and pledged their lives and fortunes to Preside
nt Lincoln. A black company in Providence, signifying its determination to engage in conflict, offered to march with the First Rhode Island Regiment as it left for the front. In Cleveland, blacks met at National Hall and offered their prayers, money, and manpower to help defeat the Confederacy as well as declared their allegiance to the government of Abraham Lincoln.9 Captain O. C. Wood of Detroit and the thirty-five members of his Detroit Military Guard tried to enlist, and Dr. G. P. Miller of Battle Creek, Michigan, sought permission from local authorities to raise 5,000 to 10,000 black soldiers. In addition, J. Sella Martin, a black clergyman, wrote to Lincoln: “If I can be of any manner of service here, should your excellency ever think it best to employ my people, I am ready to work or preach or fight to put down this rebellion.”10 Some free blacks offered their services directly to Union officials in Washington. Jack Dodson, a Senate attendant who had been with General John C. Frémont when he crossed the Rockies during the Mexican-American War, gathered three hundred blacks for the defense of the nation’s capital.11 In every Northern state, free blacks hastened to aid the Union cause, underscoring the depth of their commitment to achieving freedom and equality for blacks and their confidence that a Union victory would be a huge step in this direction.

  Unfortunately, in the first months of the conflict, Northern free blacks’ proposals to serve were consistently rejected by local, state, and federal officials.12 They all declared that they had no intention of using black soldiers. Why was there so much Northern white opposition to the idea of arming blacks? Some of the opposition was rooted in traditional beliefs and practices. After the Revolutionary War, which ended in 1783, blacks had been customarily barred from service. This custom became law with the enactment of the National Militia Act of 1792, which stated that only whites could enroll. State laws were also passed prohibiting blacks from joining militias at that level.13 Some whites also claimed that blacks lacked the qualities of good fighting men and would be more of a liability than an asset. In their opinion, blacks were neither intelligent enough nor brave enough to be good soldiers. Yet, blacks had fought in every colonial war in the 1600s and 1700s and on the sides of both the British and the Americans during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. Names such as Peter Salem, Salem Poor, Caesar Brown, Barzillai Lew, Alexander Ames, and Prince Hall show up on the rosters of black soldiers who died fighting in the Revolutionary War. And legends have grown up around the name of Crispus Attucks, a runaway who, although a member of the unruly group who taunted British soldiers stationed in Boston and as a result became a casualty of the melee in March 1770 that became known as the Boston Massacre, was, nonetheless, the first American to die for the Revolutionary cause.14

  Another group of whites feared that arming blacks would be an admission that white soldiers were somehow lacking, unable to get the job done without the help of blacks. And since most whites thought that blacks were innately inferior, the mere notion that they needed their help was alarming. Others feared that arming blacks might lead to slave insurrections, and still more whites simply did not like the idea of blacks serving alongside them. To these white men, racial equality meant social equality between the races, and social equality meant that black men would have access to white women. Miscegenation, the mixing of the races, was a likelihood that could not be tolerated. For all of these reasons, whites remained firmly opposed to arming blacks in the first months of the war. Not until the summer of 1862 did Union officials reverse themselves on the issue. This reversal took place out of necessity, because the war was going badly for the Union. Thus, Northern whites began to support the arming of blacks, slave and free alike.

  LINCOLN AND BLACK FREEDOM

  Even though Lincoln repeated that the Civil War was being fought to preserve the Union and not to end slavery, from the beginning of the war there was speculation about whether or when the slaves would be emancipated. Lincoln had believed in the gradual emancipation of slaves, but he held a mixed record on the issue of black freedom when he assumed the presidency. According to the legend of “Lincoln the Emancipator,” one day at a slave auction in New Orleans in 1830, he made an eternal vow against slavery. Witnessing the sale of a beautiful mulatto girl, he was sickened by the manner in which she was handled and inspected by prospective buyers. As he walked away, Lincoln was alleged to have remarked, “If I ever get a chance to hit that thing I’ll hit it hard.”15 Since the story was told by a man who did not accompany Lincoln on either of the two trips he made to New Orleans, it cannot stand up.16 Furthermore, although Lincoln intended to use his 1860 autobiography for campaign purposes and could not reveal any abolitionist convictions, he made no mention of slaves or the slave trade in it. He did, however, speak of a previous trip to New Orleans and recalled an incident in which he and one of his companions “were attacked by seven Negroes with intent to kill and rob them”; “hurt some in the melee,” they “succeeded in driving the Negroes from the boat.”17

  Lincoln was also alleged to have become incensed over seeing some slaves in shackles on the Ohio riverboat while a young man in his twenties. But, years later in a letter to Mary Speed dated September 27, 1841, he philosophically described the scene on board as exemplifying “the effect of condition upon human happiness.”18 Apparently, it did not bother Lincoln that one dozen slaves were shackled together like animals, separated from their families, and sold off to a place where slavery was regarded as being the harshest. Nevertheless, in his opinion, “they were the most cheerful and apparently happy creatures.” Thus, he concluded that God “renders the worst of human conditions tolerable, while He permits the best to be nothing better than tolerable.”19 Moreover, as late as 1847, he accepted a slaveholder as a law client and argued against one of the man’s slave’s claim to freedom. Lincoln lost the case.20

  As a young congressman, Lincoln introduced a bill to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, but he seemed to take a yes-and-no attitude toward the institution. His bill was carefully worded so as not to offend slaveholders. Furthermore, it called, not for the immediate emancipation of slaves, but for gradual emancipation and monetary compensation to the owners. This bill could go into effect if a majority of whites in the District voted for it in a referendum.21 Consequently, Lincoln placed himself in a no-lose situation since whites in the District would have the final say in the matter. If they approved it, his star might rise; and even if they did not, he would not be damaged politically. During the 1850s it should be borne in mind that Lincoln consistently opposed the spread of slavery into the territories, but he never advocated its termination in the Southern states.22

  As noted earlier, Lincoln’s position as president on the issue of emancipation remained consistent. As Union troops penetrated deep into Southern territory, the Confederacy began to employ slaves in their war effort. Contrabands, as they were called, were making such a substantial contribution that it became necessary for Union officials to devise strategies to counter it. Liberal Republicans threw their weight behind the first Confiscation Act, which was designed to deal with the problem of contrabands. The bill eventually garnered unanimous Republican support and Congress passed it on August 6, 1861, and sent it to Lincoln for his signature. The most controversial provision was one that authorized the seizure of Rebel slaves actively employed in the Confederate war effort. Not surprisingly, John J. Crittenden of Kentucky and other Border state Democrats were livid. They argued that the provision was nothing less than a general emancipation act. In addition, Midwest Democrats were even more aggressive with their criticism, arguing that the bill would bring several million “wooly headed, thick-lipped” Southern Negroes into the North and “Africanize” the region.

  Republicans countered with the argument that since confiscated slaves would be carefully controlled, Southern blacks were not going to flood into the free states. Moreover, they argued that owing to the fact that a war was going on, the government had every right to seize enemy property—including slave property—as legitimate contraband. Finally, Republ
icans maintained that since the bill affected only those slaves used for rebel war purposes, it was hardly a general emancipation bill, which eradicated slavery as a state institution. Instead, it was an entirely legal war measure designed to weaken Confederate military forces and help terminate the rebellion. Apparently, Lincoln was persuaded by the arguments of the Republicans, as he elected to sign the bill into law. The first Confiscation Act was, to a large extent, similar to General Benjamin Butler’s contraband policy, which Lincoln had already upheld. Nevertheless, when racial antagonisms flared up in the wake of the act, Lincoln reiterated his position that emancipation was not a goal in the war.23 Clearly, events beyond the president’s control had moved him to sign the first Confiscation Act. He sincerely believed that it would help him accomplish his overall objective, the preservation of the Union.

  Throughout 1861 in particular, Lincoln’s chief concern was to maintain a united coalition of war Democrats and Border state Unionists as well as Republicans in support of the war effort. In order to accomplish this goal, Lincoln deemed it imperative to define the war as being solely for the Union and not a war against slavery. Defining the conflict as one to preserve the Union would unite his coalition, while describing it as a struggle against slavery would fragment it. Accordingly, on August 30, Lincoln rescinded General Frémont’s emancipation edict in Missouri,24 which placed the state under martial law and ordered that the slaves of rebels there be seized and “declared freemen.”25 Lincoln could not allow the emancipation edict to stand because it would jeopardize his political and military efforts to prevent the Border states of Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri from seceding. Moreover, efforts were also under way to garner the support of Unionists in western Virginia and eastern Tennessee.26 Given the circumstances under which Lincoln operated early in the war, it is easy to understand his reluctance to support Frémont’s edict. At the same time, however, his decision to rescind the order did not cause him great grief, as it was consistent with his principal war aim.